

"The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi"
11 March 1942
No. 23,588

A SPEECH BY KENRYO SATO
CHIEF OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION
OF THE WAR MINISTRY.

Hot Pursuit of America and Britain. Not to be Relaxed.
Internal Structure Must be Reinforced.

Major General Kenryo Sato, Chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Ministry, delivered the following speech at the Army Day commemoration lecture meeting, held from 6:30 p.m. on March 10, the Thirty-Seventh Army Day, at Hibiya Public Hall, Tokyo:

"Recalling the Russo-Japanese War on this anniversary of the Mukden Battle, which, together with the Battle of the Japan Sea, brought about an end to the Russo-Japanese War, I wish to express my views on the direction of the Greater East Asia War and our firm belief in gaining ultimate victory.

The Time of Starting the Russo-Japanese War and the Initial Battle.

"Generally speaking, there are two points that are most important in a war. One is to select the right time for starting war and to obtain substantial results in the initial battle. The other is to gain a complete victory in the ultimate battle which truly determines victory or defeat. What required our country's deepest consideration in selecting the time for starting the Russo-Japanese War was to start the war before the construction of the Siberian Railway was completed and before its great transportation capacity was developed. We seized our opportunity to start the war, though we had many troublesome internal difficulties. This selection of the right time for battle and the resulting surprise attack against Port Arthur, the crossing of the Yalu River, the surprise landing on the Liao-tung Peninsula and other brilliant war results, brought to nothing the Russians' operational plan to mass their army between Haicheng and Kiao-yang and to defeat one by one with a determined offensive our forces which were marching northward from the direction of the Korean Peninsula on the one hand and from the Liao-tung Peninsula on the other.

Opening of the Greater East Asia War, The Time and the Initial Battle.

"The points which required consideration in the selection of the time for opening the Greater East Asia War were the amount of reserve war materials and the various tactical factors for the landing operations against Malaya. If there was no way of breaking the deadlock in the Japanese-American negotiations, the time for opening the war would surely decide the fate of our country. That is, with the opening of the war, reserve war materials would be fast consumed and, unless the graph of consumption of war materials could be completely adjusted with the graph of the new production which could be newly and steadily acquired by operations, the continuance of the war would become impossible.

"If our country were dragged along by America's policy of procrastination, we would have grown poorer and poorer and the adjustment of the consumption graph and the new production graph rendered impossible, thereby crippling the country, because we consumed annually hundreds of thousands of tons of oil, even if the Greater East Asia War had not been started. The other matter which was the subject of the greatest anxiety to the Army and Navy in the initial battle was the landing operations against Malaya. Landing operations are seriously affected by the moon, the tide, and the monsoon. Because of these factors, December 8 was the last opportune moment. The decision of our Empire to start the Greater East Asia War by seizing the opportunity in the direction of our national policy was a feat that finds its place in the most illustrious moments of history.

The Cardinal Principle of Directing the Greater East Asia War.

"Secondly, what will be the greatest decisive battle in the Greater East Asia War which will be comparable with the Mukden Battle and the Battle of the Japan Sea?

Our Empire has already captured Singapore, the greatest of the British strategic bases in East Asia, taken possession of all the strategic bases in the South Seas, and is now completing the occupation of Burma, whereby our military power will control the Indian Ocean. The loss of Singapore, which, together with the Suez Canal and Gibraltar, both of which will perhaps be occupied later by the German and the Italian Armies, forms Britain's three great key points in the world from the standpoint of strategy and trade, is not only a serious loss to the existence of the British Empire, but places under our complete control areas with important

resources in China and the South Seas. Furthermore, it will not be long before India and Australia fall out of the British Empire. Thus, even if the British Empire fails to collapse altogether, it will be nothing but a tributary of America.

"Thus, while bringing about the collapse of the British Empire, we shall be securing and consolidating strategic bases in the Pacific against America. Meanwhile, Germany and Italy while pressing hard on the British rear guard line, will secure and consolidate strategic points in the Atlantic. Finally, Japan, Germany and Italy, in perfect cooperation, will employ both political and military tactics to defeat Britain and America by carrying out active operations in both the Pacific and the Atlantic.

What Are the Enemies' Measures?

"What measures will the enemies take against us? America and Britain are placing great expectations on the Soviet-German War. They also appear to be planning to consolidate their contacts with Soviet Russia via Africa, the Near East and the Caucasus, and also their contacts with India and China via the Near East, with a view to smashing German and Italian spearheads, while checking cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy. Then they hope to take the offensive against Japan. From what direction will this offensive come? First, they may force the Soviet Union to attack the Japanese mainland from the north, using the Maritime Provinces as their base. But it should be more than clear what the fate of Soviet territory in East Asia will be if the Soviet Union should attack Japan in cooperation with America. When Ex-Foreign Minister Matsuoka visited Stalin in Moscow, their conversation happened to touch on the problem of the Maritime Provinces. It is said that Stalin, holding a stick under his chin as if he were hanging himself, stressed that to lose the Maritime Provinces was to Soviet Russia like hanging herself. However, since it is always the cardinal principle of war to rely on one's own preparations, we have already fully prepared ourselves for any emergency.

"The second course is for the enemies to attack us from the Southwestern Pacific and the Indian Ocean, gradually taking back those strategic bases that have already fallen into our hands or will be occupied by us in the near future. Under present conditions, however, Anglo-American offensive operations against Japan are a very, very hard task, unless a great commander makes some very wonderful plan. We do not know from where the ~~next~~ attack will come, from the north or from the south, but we must anticipate that America and

Britain will seek a decisive battle with Japan in one, two, or three years after America has completed the expansion of her armaments.

The Lesson of the Russo-Japanese War.

"In the Russo-Japanese War, our army gained consecutive victories from the beginning. The Russian General Kropatkin, upon being defeated at the Battle of Liaoyang, decided to give up Mukden and to retreat as far back as Tieling. Herein lies a great lesson. If our army had possessed a rallying force and had hotly pursued the Russian troops after the Battle of Liaoyang, further battles would not have been fought and the war would have ended then and there. Alas, however, the Japanese Army at that time possessed no such rallying force and hence could not make any chase worthy of the name. That is to say, up to the Battle of Mukden, Japan could not compete with Russia in concentrating or expanding fighting power. In the light of this lesson, the best way to win the present war is to forestall and frustrate the intentions of the enemies, and cause their submission without fighting another Battle of Mukden or another Battle of the Japan Sea.

Anglo-American Contradictions and Miscalculations

A. Contradictions in American War Aims

"Here I wish to point out the enemies' contradictions and miscalculations. First, the contradictions in American war aims. Ever since the time when the Chinese Incident broke out, the European War occurred and the Greater East Asia War was started, the United States, always with the object of protecting democracy, has been trying to fight Japan's expansionist policy, Hitlerism and Fascism. And yet America is now associated with the Soviet Union. Isn't communism the most formidable enemy of democracy? Aside from this inconsistency, America has adopted the defense policy of making London, Moscow and Chungking the first line of her national defense and assigning to herself the role of an arsenal for supporting Britain, Chiang Kai-Shek and the Soviet Union, whereby to achieve her national policy, by offering goods instead of blood. Moreover, utilizing to advantage her neutral position, she is obtaining as much as she pleases of rubber, tin, tungsten and other important products from the various parts of the world, especially from East Asia, and she is making strenuous efforts to expand her armaments, in the hope of gaining the greatest voice, nay, the highest power of command in the world when the belligerents have been finally exhausted. However, the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War

has radically upset America's defense policy. The Chungking Government is being reduced to a local regime in the interior, while Japan has inflicted great damage to the Allied Powers, cut off America from the treasure islands of the South Seas, deprived her of almost all strategic points in the Pacific, and inflicted heavy losses to the American Navy.

"Thus, America, which might have gained victory by sacrificing only materials, has no prospect of victory, nay, she will be a loser, even if she made sacrifices both in materials and human blood. The chief cause of this sad plight of America's can be traced back to the question of stationing Japanese troops in special districts of China for a certain specified period of time, which was the last point in the Japanese-American negotiations. America opposed the stationing of Japanese troops, because she was deceived by Chiang Kai-Shek's propaganda. Roosevelt had a great mind to please the Chinese and win their applause. Chiang Kai-Shek himself neither thought it possible to secure the complete evacuation of Japanese troops, nor considered it would be impossible to make peace with Japan unless complete evacuation was effected. As a matter of fact, the Chungking side once intimated to Japan through a certain channel that it had the intention of recognizing the stationing of Japanese troops in certain specified districts of China. It follows that we must not overlook the fact that behind the greatest cause of the rupture of the Japanese-American negotiations was this stupid ambition of Roosevelt's, who had been influenced by Chiang Kai-Shek's propaganda.

B. Miscalculation of Japan's Fighting Power.

"The fundamental cause of the commission of such a serious blunder by American leaders may be traced back to the fact that Japan's excessive humility toward America in her past foreign policy and other matters invited for herself American contempt. Especially since the outbreak of the China Affair, America thought Japan had completely exhausted her national strength.

"In 1936 our army formulated a national defense plan, for the army felt keenly the necessity of expanding armaments and productive power in order to secure and develop the results of the Manchurian Incident. As the expansion of armaments and rearmament by the European Powers were to be completed by 1941 or 1942, we anticipated an international crisis at about that time. Therefore, considering it necessary to complete by every means possible the expansion of our armaments and productive power by 1942, we decided to effect a great expansion by means of a six-year armament plan for the period 1937 to 1942, and a five-year production expansion plan for the period 1937 to 1941. In 1937, the first year of

this plan, the Lukouchiao Incident broke out. What worried us most was the fear that this incident might cause the break-down of our Armament Expansion Plan and the Five-Year Production Expansion Plan. So we decided to see that the Chinese Incident would not end in a war of attrition to our side. Accordingly, generally speaking, we spent 40% of our budget on the Chinese Incident and 60% on armament expansion. In respect to iron and other important materials allotted to the army, we spent 20% on the Chinese Incident and 80% on the expansion of armaments. As a result, the air force and mechanized units have been greatly expanded and the fighting power of the whole Japanese Army has been increased to more than three times what it was before the China Incident. I believe that our Navy, which suffered very little attrition in the China Affair must have perfected and expanded its fighting power. Of course, productive power of the munition industry has been expanded 70 to 80% at a rough estimate.

"Besides the above-said armaments and productive power, we have separately defeated each anti-Japanese force in China and occupied the greater part of the important portions of China, and the iron ore, coal, cotton and other important defense resources obtained from these areas are now contributing greatly to our fighting power. We have completed our establishment of strategic points on the continent, in particular our troops have marched into French-Indo-China, which gave us powerful footing for the present Greater East Asia War. Furthermore, through four and a half years of the China Affair we have gained real training in actual fighting. Their intangible results are now being developed before our eyes.

Sword and Abacus

"According to what I heard recently from certain people who had been on friendly terms with American leaders, the latter seem to think that Japan's expansionist policy cannot be checked at all, that if Japanese troops once march southward, it cannot be helped if the Philippines, Malaya and the Netherlands Indies fall into Japanese hands for a time; but that after breaking the brunt of the German attack, the Allied Powers will be able to subdue Japan very soon if they face Japan cooperatively and apply the great economic power of Britain and America, because Japan will exhaust her national strength more and more owing to her military advance into the Southern areas. British leaders seem to think the same.

"It is very comic that they think too much of economic power. They are committing again the same mistake that they did in mistakenly judging that Japan would be ruined economically by the China Affair. If a cartoonist is allowed to depict this, he will perhaps draw a picture in which Miyamoto-Musashi, a famous fencer of the Tokugawa Era, is brandishing his sword while underneath a clerk of a big shop tries to check the blow with an abacus. The enemies probably realized the difference of power between a sword and an abacus from the initial battles of the present war, but they must be shown by facts that their abacus is getting out of order.

"The American Navy will probably regain in two or three years what it lost in the initial battle of the war and build, in addition, more powerful warships. Aircraft, tanks and army units also will be enormously increased. However, the military training necessary for operating these arms cannot be carried out in a short time. Moreover, we have a tremendous advantage over America in respect to strategic positions.

Analysis of Causes of the Greater East Asia War

"The most important problem for directing the war is the expansion of productive power. This cannot be unrelated to the stabilization and maintenance of the people's life. We can neither fight nor produce with an empty stomach. Hence we do not ask people to work without food. Therefore, the Army pays the greatest attention to the rice-problem and does not grudge closest cooperation in bringing back rice from the South, even though it causes much inconvenience to military operations. Nay, the Army thinks it a part of military operations to acquire and transport rice, and is firmly determined that there shall be no dearth and unrest over the total amount of our nation's chief diet.

"As I have already said, the enemy makes it his war aim to protect democracy, and has declared war against Japan's ideology of the coprosperity sphere, and against the Hitlerism of Germany. The war has taken the pattern of a purely ideological war. It goes without saying how dangerous it is in the prosecution of war to have within the country still many admirers of liberalism, which is the monopoly of the enemy. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the outcome of war was decided simply by armed force. There was no such thing as ideological war then. For the prosecution of war poisonous remnants of western civilization must be speedily rooted out. If we analyze the causes of the Greater East Asia War, we have the following domestic problems apart from armed clashes:

Attrition of Aircraft and Ships -- Expansion of Productive Power and Ensurance of People's Life -- Exclusion of Liberalism and other Poisonous Remnants of Western Civilization. Invincible Conviction.

"Since the secret of winning the Greater East Asia War lies in the solution of internal problems, we ought to pay great interest to the renovation and strengthening of our internal structure. I don't wish to touch much on internal problems here, but at the time of the crucial point in Japanese-American negotiations last year, I felt there was no clear manifestation of a truly united national opinion, and a truly organized people's strength. Of course, I heard the voice of our people and there was no doubt about the existence of the strength of our great nation, but I felt that I could not believe in any realistic sense that this voice and strength was so united and organized as to truly propel and assist the Government and to put it into practice. In order to gain final victory and successfully build up the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, we must conquer many difficulties. Since most of them are internal problems in the final analysis, it is most important for us to establish a national organization fully imbued with the spirit of assisting Imperial Rule by performance of our duties as subjects in order to tide over these difficulties.

Doc. No. 9027.

C E R T I F I C A T E (for use only)

I hereby certify that the following copy in Japanese is identical with the article appearing in our press; No. 23588 of THE TOKYO NICHU-NICHU SHIMBUN (Dated 11 Apr. 1942 /SHOWA 17/

Mr. SUTO, Chief of the Section of Military Affairs of the War Ministry, emphasizes the secrets of sure victory:

"We must not relax our efforts to hotly pursue BRITAIN and AMERICA and we should strengthen our internal structure."

D.T.L: 15 Oct. 1946 /SHOWA 21/

/S/ Director of the Data Department
of THE NICHU-NICHU SHIMBUN
HIROSHI TAMURA